Fine Tuning, God, and Fallacy due to Limited Perspective

Many creationists claim that the cosmos is fine-tuned to permit life, and if any of many constants were only slightly different, life would be impossible.  This portion is much like what is known in astrophysics as the weak anthropic principle.   Creationists assert further that such fine-tuning suggests or can be best explained by an intelligent force.

“The fine-tuning of the universe is shown in the precise strengths of four basic forces. Gravity is the best known of these forces and is the weakest, with a relative strength of 1. Next comes the weak nuclear force that holds the neutron together. It is 10³⁴ times stronger than gravity but works only at subatomic distances. Electromagnetism is 1,000 times stronger than the weak nuclear force, and the strong nuclear force, which keeps protons together in the nucleus of an atom, is 100 times stronger yet. If even one of these forces had a slightly different strength, the life-sustaining universe we know would be impossible.

If gravity were slightly stronger, all stars would be large, like the ones that produce iron and other heavier elements, but they would burn out too rapidly for the development of life. On the other hand, if gravity were weaker, the stars would endure, but none would produce the heavier elements necessary to form planets.

The weak nuclear force controls the decay of neutrons. If it were stronger, neutrons would decay more rapidly, and there would be nothing in the universe but hydrogen. However, if this force were weaker, all the hydrogen would turn into helium and other elements.

The electromagnetic force binds atoms to one another to form molecules. If it were either weaker or stronger, no chemical bonds would form, so no life could exist.

Finally, the strong nuclear force overcomes the electromagnetic force and allows the atomic nucleus to exist. Like the weak nuclear force, changing it would produce a universe with only hydrogen or with no hydrogen.

In sum, without planets, hydrogen, and chemical bonds, there would be no life as we know it.

Besides these 4 factors, there are at least 25 others that require pinpoint precision to produce a universe that contains life. Getting each of them exactly right suggests the presence of an Intelligent Designer.”

~ChristanityToday.com

When one looks at the laws of nature, we must realize that any laws that would not be in harmony with other laws just could not exist.  Any law of nature that, say “tried” to exist, but would have made it impossible for the universe to exist would not have been able to continue to exist itself.  We are inevitably always going to be left with a universe that is at least “fine-tuned” enough to continue to exist.  From our perspective we are manifestly locked into a perspective where we see a large degree of fine-tuning because it's that arraignment that brought us into being, though we may wish it were even better.  Note, how the article itself states "there would be no life as we know it," so if the universe had been different, then we would just be different and be thinking what a fine-tuned universe we have.  There are in fact multi-universe theories that postulate the existence of multitudes of other universes, and many may not contain much of anything, and many may produce a different kind of life.  Whatever IS produced by any set of natural laws is going to see that set of laws as being fine-tuned.  Anything that is not produced will not be around to say "What a mis-tuned universe."  A person who is saved by the expert treatment of a fine doctor can live to say “what a great doctor!”, but the patient that dies due to the medical incompetence of a doctor is no longer around to say “What a lousy doctor.”  Going back to the tsunami tragedy, the people who were drowning certainly weren’t thinking about how highly tuned the universe is while they were gasping for air and found only sea water.  On the other hand, the lower life forms that fed off the decaying corpses would have thought (if they could have thought): "Gee, look at how finely tuned the universe it to provide us with such abundant food."  From the perspective of those which the universe produces the universe always appears finely tuned.

For a more philosophical approach:

 

URL:  http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm
Copyright © Norman Swartz 1997, 2004 First posted: Oct. 24, 1997 Updated, with additional links: Oct. 7, 2004 Department of Philosophy Simon Fraser University	These notes may be freely reproduced, in whole or in part, provided the copyright notice and URL (above) are preserved on the copy. Any other reproduction is illegal.

"One can find in the writing of many contemporary scientists and philosophers two claims which – I allege – are inconsistent with one another:

1. The laws of Nature are descriptions.
2. The laws of Nature govern the world (or, as it is sometimes expressed, whatever happens does so in accord with the laws of Nature).

There is something more than a little strange in these two views. The second would seem to be the proper companion to the view that laws of nature are prescriptions, not descriptions. How, we might ask, can a description govern the world?

Put another way, I think that the source of the problem of causal determinism and its supposed incompatibility with free will lies in the failure of many persons to fully shake off the historical view that laws of nature govern the world.

On a strictly descriptivist view, laws of nature do not govern the universe. To govern the universe, laws of nature would require unknown (dare I say, magical?) powers. Moreover, the view that laws of nature govern the universe turns the semantic theory of truth upside-down. It presupposes a theory which I think is, ultimately, unintelligible, namely an anti-Tarskian theory that propositions do not 'take their truth' from the way the world is, but rather 'impose' their truth on the world. We will do well to abandon this outmoded, supernatural, theory.

The way out of the puzzle about free will and causal determinism is to adopt a thoroughly modern view of natural laws, removed once and for all from its supernatural, theistic, origins. . . .

... A good example of the view I am advocating can be found in the proposition, attributed to Sir Thomas Gresham (1519?-1579) but already known earlier, called – not surprisingly – "Gresham's Law":

[Gresham's Law is] the theory holding that if two kinds of money in circulation have the same denominational value but different intrinsic values, the money with higher intrinsic value will be hoarded and eventually driven out of circulation by the money with lesser intrinsic value.

(In effect what this 'law' states is that 'bad money drives out good'. For example, in countries where the governments begin issuing vast amounts of paper money, that money becomes next-to-worthless and people hoard 'good' money, e.g. gold and silver coins, and that 'good' money ceases to circulate.)

Why, when paper money becomes virtually worthless, do people hoard gold? Because gold retains its economic value – it can be used in emergencies to purchase food, clothing, flight (if need be), medicine, etc., even when 'bad' paper money will likely not be able to be so used. People do not hoard gold under such circumstances because Gresham's 'Law' forces them to do so. Gresham's 'Law' is purely descriptive (not prescriptive) and illustrates well the point I am making: descriptive laws are not causal agents – they do not force the world to be some particular way rather than another.

The manner in which we regard Gresham's 'Law' ought, I suggest, to be the way we regard all laws of nature. The laws of physics and chemistry are no different than the laws of economics: all laws of nature – of physics, of chemistry, of biology, of economics, of psychology, of sociology, etc. – are nothing more, nor anything less, than (a certain subclass of) true propositions.

Perhaps you are beginning to see that I am offering the same sort of solution to the presumed problem of causal determinism that I offered above for the problems of logical and of epistemic determinism. The truth of propositions, whether singular (containing proper names) or universal/statistical (and free of proper names), does not force the world to be one way rather than another. The world unfolds, including our actions and choices. And whichever way it does unfold, propositions 'look after themselves'. They take their truth from the way the world is. They don't 'force' the world to be any particular way at all."